nuclear weapons spending out of control—we bite back!
our exclusive budget analysis...the facts & figures

“reliable replacement warhead” program discredited
non-proliferation work: DOE and NNSA way behind!
nuke sites cleanup: time for a reality check!
this convenient handbook
on nuclear weapons budget issues
is brought to you by
nuclear watch
of new mexico
dedicated to public education and advocacy on
regional, national and global nuclear issues.
You can reach us at 505-989-7342
or: 551 Cordova Rd. #808, Santa Fe NM 87505
Still hungry for information?
Feast on facts, figures and footnotes
at our award-winning website
nukewatch.org
Our regular quarterly newsletter is the Watchdog.
Let us know if you’d like
to be on our mailing list.

WATCHDOG
Capitol Hill Edition Spring ‘07
is a special compilation
prepared for release at the
annual “DC Days” gathering of the

alliance for
nuclear accountability
a national coalition of grassroots groups
working on nuclear issues across the nation.
The complete list of member groups
in ANA is at the back of this booklet.

2007 marks
ANA’s 20th anniversary
(originally founded as the
Military Production Network)
Happy Birthday, ANA!!!
Decoding the Nuclear Weapons Budget
With money for nukes cleverly scattered throughout the FY08 budget, some sleuthing is required to piece the whole picture together. The shocking total, and our analysis p.3

Reliable Replacement Warhead
New scientific findings nullified NNSA’s original rationale for RRW. Now they’re trying to keep the troubled program alive—even though we don’t need it, and can’t afford it p.7

NonProliferation
How to create new jobs and enhance national security while meeting our international treaty obligations (for a change) p.10

Cleaning Up Weapons Waste
A bird’s-eye view of a coast-to-coast mess. Don Hancock gives us the big picture and lays out some priorities p.12

Alliance for Nuclear Accountability member organizations p.15

nukewatch director Jay Coghlan
research director Scott Kovac
communications John Witham
contributing writer Don Hancock
designer/editor Sasha Pyle
political cartoonist Jamie Chase

nukewatch steering committee: mary lou cook (emerita)
rico johnson, shelby miller, sasha pyle, john stroud, cathie sullivan
alphabet soup

who left all these ugly acronyms lying around?
in order of appearance, more or less

DOE  United States Department of Energy
     because Department of Nukes doesn’t sound very nice

NNSA  National Nuclear Security Administration
      (DOE’s semi-autonomous weapons branch)

FY08  Fiscal Year 2008, for federal budget purposes

Complex 2030  (OK, it’s not really an acronym)
         The weapons complex NNSA wants in place
         by the year 2030, and is actively promoting now

RRW  Reliable Replacement Warhead
     NNSA’s plan to ramp up the weapons complex
     by funding a new generation of warheads

LANL  Los Alamos National Laboratory
     (a key nuclear weapons facility)

LLNL  Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
      (another one)

NPT  the 1970 NonProliferation Treaty
     (The one waving and shouting “Hi, remember me?”)
     Signed by 189 countries who agreed to negotiate in
     good faith to stop the nuclear arms race; also calls
     for the eventual elimination of nuclear arsenals

GNEP  Global Nuclear Energy Partnership
     Administration plan to jump-start the nuclear power
     industry, promoted as “recycling” though it creates
     new wastes--and relies on technology we don’t have
Decoding the Nuclear Weapons Budget

Money for nukes is stashed all over the FY08 budget. We found it and added it up. Here are some surprising findings.

In February the Bush Administration submitted its Congressional Budget Request for the Department of Energy’s nuclear weapons programs for fiscal year 2008, which begins October 1. As if budgets aren’t complicated enough, the last Congress was incapable of passing many appropriations bills. Our newly elected Congress enacted a “Continuing Resolution” to keep the federal government funded, and the amounts of funding for this still current fiscal year (2007) have only now become available.

In FY 2008, research, testing and production programs for nuclear weapons under DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) will cost taxpayers $6.51 billion. The agency plans to spend more than $29 billion on nuclear weapons from FY 2009 to FY 2012, nearly 50% above Cold War averages.

Much of this to-be-spent taxpayers’ money will revolve around the NNSA and labs’ claims that the nuclear weapons complex and the stockpile must be transformed to meet unspecified “future military threats.” This follows the Bush doctrine of justifiable preemptive wars and the 2002 “Nuclear Posture Review” expansion of possible rationales for using nuclear weapons. NNSA’s touted vehicle for transformation is new-design nuclear weapons under the so-called Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW--see page 7).

These claims contradict: 1) Binding commitments made by nuclear weapons states to disarm stockpiles under the 1970 NonProliferation Treaty, signed by 189 countries (more than any other treaty); and 2) recent studies by independent experts that concluded plutonium pit “triggers,” the crucial nuclear weapons components, have reliable lifetimes of a century or more. This gives our country some 70 years to arrive at nuclear weapons policies that truly encourage nonproliferation.

facts, figures and footnotes galore available on-line at nukewatch.org.
Instead, NNSA explicitly plans to pay for RRW by decreasing maintenance and refurbishment programs for already existing, reliable nuclear weapons, and further setting a terrible global non-proliferation example through new nuclear weapons.

Selected Highlights of NNSA’s Nuclear Weapons Budget

- NNSA is now actively pursuing “Complex 2030,” the nuclear weapons complex it wants by that year, but there is no budget line item for it in the FY08 request. We think that money could be hidden in an account for NNSA’s “Office of Administrator” (separate from its nuclear weapons budget) which earmarks $330.67 million for “Nuclear Deterrent.” Its stated goal is to “Transform the...stockpile and supporting infrastructure to be more responsive to the threats of the 21st Century.” If we are correct, this brings the true costs of NNSA’s FY 2008 nuclear weapons programs to $6.84 billion. Moreover, the NNSA Office of Administrator plans to spend $1.4 billion on “Nuclear Deterrent” from FYs 2009 to 2012.

- The FY08 request asks for $24.9 million to design and plan for a “Consolidated Plutonium Center,” which would be Complex 2030’s single most important facility. Its main mission: to produce at least 125 plutonium pits per year for the Reliable Replacement Warhead, beginning in 2022. By way of contrast, NNSA’s repeated funding requests for its previously proposed (now defeated) “Modern Pit Facility” averaged a mere $8.5 million.

- For RRW, NNSA requested $27.7 million in FY07, and Congress gave it $35.9 million under the Continuing Resolution. NNSA has already requested $88.8 million for FY08, but says that it will ask for a budget adjustment
that could only add more. But this is just the tip of the iceberg. Most nuclear weapons programs report they are being realigned to support RRW, without detailing specific costs. It is not possible to calculate, but total RRW costs in FY 2008 could reach half a billion dollars. Additionally, under the Department of Defense budget, the Navy is asking for $30 million for RRW in ’08 - - and $50 million in ’09.

- The NNSA’s FY08 budget request suggests that the nuclear weapons complex is increasingly shifting to production. Compared to FY 2007, the three design labs took a $261 million hit to their nuclear weapons programs (mostly for advanced computing), but the four production plants had their combined requests rise by $172 million. The request for nuclear weapons activities at NNSA’s Washington DC headquarters increased to $492.10 million for FY 2008, a 79% jump over 2007!

- NukeWatch has long argued that Los Alamos will probably become the nation’s permanent plutonium pit production center, largely by default and because of

continued on page 6

...and what does LANL’s budget look like? Not pretty. See for yourself.

Los Alamos National Laboratory
FY 2008 Budget Request (in Millions of Dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Budget Request (Millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Weapons Programs (62.8%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Work for Others”* (Estimated at 16.8%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear NonProliferation (7.7%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleanup (6.4%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science (2.5%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Reactor &amp; Fuel Cycle (1.8%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radiological Facilities Mgmt. (0.9%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yucca Mountain Projects (0.6%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy Efficiency/Electric Delivery (0.5%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fossil Energy R&amp;D (0.03%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Other Defense Activities (0.01%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renewable Energy/Biomass (0.002%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* such as the Department of Defense, FBI, CIA and NNSA

LANL budget snapshot: Nuclear weapons programs 62.8%... to renewable energies .002%. This graph says it all -- need we say more about Lab priorities, and how they should change?
increasing budget constraints, a new “Rocky Flats South” if you will. Not coincidentally, NNSA’s decision to raise “interim” production (from 20 pits per year to 50) is pending this summer. A crucial determinant for even higher production levels is an advanced plutonium facility now being built at LANL, ponderously called (drumroll, please) the Chemical and Metallurgical Research Replacement Project (CMRR). Last year, the House of Representatives declared building CMRR made sense only if LANL were to become the Consolidated Plutonium Center, and slashed funding. In contrast, a Senate budget subcommittee chaired by Pete Domenici fully funded CMRR, and ordered NNSA to study expanding its previously defined mission, likely meaning direct pit production. The now passed Continuing Resolution for FY 2007 “split the baby,” funding CMRR at $53.4 million, a serious blow. The FY08 request for CMRR is $95.6 million, $65 million less than originally planned--because even NNSA had to acknowledge that its future mission depends on Complex 2030. While its mission and funding remain very much in play, CMRR lumbers on. Over the long-term, we are still betting that Los Alamos will become the country’s permanent site for plutonium pit production.

- LANL FY08 budget snapshot: Nuclear weapons programs 62.8%, nonproliferation programs 7.7%, cleanup 6.4%, science 2.5%, energy efficiency .5%, renewable energies .002%. The graph on page 5 says it all...need we say more about Lab priorities, and the need to change them?

I STILL FEEL HUNGRY.
Reliable Replacement Warhead

NNSA is fighting hard for this discredited program. And it could actually undermine the dependability of the stockpile.

Intoxicated by raking in billions--make that trillions--of dollars during frenzied Cold War production, the nuclear weapons industry doesn’t know when to stop. The relentless push for new weapons design and manufacturing keeps rearing its ugly head. Emboldened by the Bush Administration’s 2002 “Nuclear Posture Review” and pre-emptive war doctrine, the weaponers continue to shirk cleanup and non-proliferation-related duties in favor of new facilities and weapons designs. Even when strongly rebuked by Congress and the public, DOE/NNSA’s planned new facilities and designs tend to reappear with new names and new rationales. The good news: we said “no” to Advanced Concepts (mini-nukes and bunker-busters) and the Modern Pit Facility. The bad news: they have morphed into Reliable Replacement Warhead and Complex-2030, with much heftier pricetags to the taxpayers. The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program sounds like sensible stockpile maintenance. But the name is dangerously deceptive. The fact is, a costly new generation of untested weapons will be less reliable than our existing stockpile, especially if funding is cut to the Life Extension Programs which currently keep our arsenal viable.

The big news in recent months has been definitive scientific findings that plutonium pit “triggers” are not as vulnerable to aging problems as NNSA has stated, that in fact they can last 100 years or more. These results undercut once and for all the original justification for RRW. No sooner were the findings released than NNSA began furiously back-pedaling to find other excuses to keep this troubled program alive. The cost would be staggering (see budget article). The facilities that would have to be built to support this level of warhead production form the core of NNSA’s hoped-for Complex 2030. RRW is now the reason for Complex 2030, and vice versa. Neither has a sound raison d’etre in science or in national security, the pillars on which our nation’s nuclear weapons policy was built from its very inception. We can easily debunk the rhetoric used to push these misguided, wasteful and dangerous programs. On pages 8 and 9 we rebut their claims point by point.
In response to the independent plutonium pit lifetime studies, NNSA recently posted a fact sheet called “Myth vs. Fact: The Truth About Plutonium Aging.” We responded with our own fact sheet, “Myth vs. Fact: The Truth about Complex 2030 and the Reliable Replacement Warhead,” which rebuts each of their arguments and provides extensive documentation (footnotes and links). We invite you to read the full text of both fact sheets, theirs and ours. Here is a summary.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>their document</th>
<th>our document</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Myth vs. Fact:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Myth vs. Fact:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Truth About Plutonium Aging</td>
<td>The Truth about Complex 2030 and the Reliable Replacement Warhead</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>they say:</th>
<th>we say:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The age of plutonium doesn’t equal the age of a weapon. There are thousands of parts; the plutonium pit isn’t the only one that needs maintenance. High explosives, organic components and corrosion are some of the other factors that can affect performance, reliability and life expectancy of weapons systems.</td>
<td>The non-nuclear components can be tested outside of the weapons. This includes the high explosives, which have actually been shown to grow more stable with age. However, new pits can’t be tested; it’s banned by the international test moratorium. That’s why pit performance remains the key factor. Nukes should be “re-manufactured” as close to original design as possible and only on an as-needed basis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Plutonium aging was not and is not the only reason for RRW. Others are: ensured confidence in reliability, improved manufacturability, increased safety and security, reduced likelihood of the need for future underground testing, and decreased numbers of weapons in the stockpile. | The Administration’s 2002 Nuclear Posture Review, which expanded the rationale for possible use of nuclear weapons, is RRW’s primary driver. RRW maintains NNSA’s capability to design and build new weapons for new military purposes, barred by the NonProliferation Treaty. Existing weapons can be reliable far into the future. Why trade them in for unproven new designs? We should reduce the existing stockpile. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>they say:</th>
<th>we say:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regardless of plutonium aging, RRW is needed to ensure confidence in the reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile well into the future. Programs which refurbish existing warheads introduce small changes which take them farther away from configurations that were tested underground. RRWs would be less sensitive to these changes. Parts that are difficult to manufacture and maintain would be replaced with safer ones. RRW will reduce the need for underground testing.</td>
<td>RRW is not only unneeded, but could actually compromise our national security. NNSA plans to pay for it by cutting funds for “Life Extension Programs” currently maintaining those weapons. The danger is that those programs will be dropped, to make RRW appear essential. RRWs can’t be validated by full-scale tests; that would have dire non-proliferation impacts. Already-tested weapons have a pedigree that RRWs can’t equal. The current stockpile is proven reliable and can thus be reduced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We need Complex 2030 with or without RRW and regardless of plutonium aging. It will transform and modernize the Cold War-era infrastructure into a smaller, more efficient complex suited to respond to future challenges. This complex will include increased warhead dismantlements; consolidating special nuclear materials; and more efficient business practices.</td>
<td>The aging study details both RRW and Complex 2030. NNSA’s central proposed facility: the Consolidated Plutonium Center, intended to make at least 125 RRW pits a year, which we don’t need to curate the stockpile. NNSA can’t claim it is creating a smaller complex; it plans to close none of its 8 sites that design, produce and test nukes. RRW could hinder dismantlement; the same facilities could be used for either. Our gravest threat is proliferation, which is stimulated by RRW. (And couldn’t better business practices happen now?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of the five nuclear weapons states recognized by the NonProliferation Treaty, the U.S. is the only one without a dedicated facility to manufacture plutonium pits. This is a national security risk. By building a consolidated center for surveillance, fabrication, research and development in one secure location, NNSA will reduce security costs and improve its efficiency.</td>
<td>We don’t need 125 new pits a year. There is an existing pit production facility at Los Alamos, attempting to expand production to 50 pits a year. Its currently sanctioned level of 20 pits a year is more than enough to maintain stockpile reliability. To lower security costs, stop plutonium operations at other sites. Why make more pits than needed... if indeed any are needed at all?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NonProliferation
Does it necessarily mean job loss?

Critics of the national laboratories often voice dismay about what isn’t
being done there, as well as what is. “Why can’t the tax dollars and brainpower
be put to better use?” is a common refrain. By now it’s become a tradition at
DOE hearings—indeed, nearly a cliché—to point to the shocking lack of human
and financial resources allocated to renewable energy R&D, and to call for a
“Manhattan Project-scale” effort. Fruitful geothermal and solar energy programs
have been snuffed. The vestigial programs that remain receive almost no funds.
There’s no doubt that this situation has to change, the sooner the better.

But there’s another area of work that needs pumping up at the labs
too: activities that support non-proliferation.

Non-proliferation is not an absence or a vacuum. It’s going to take
work, and it can create new jobs. A dedicated approach to stockpile mainten-
nance/curatorship, dismantlement of unneeded nukes, responsible disposal and
recycling of the materials therein, and all the cleanup, reorganization and
retooling of existing facilities for other purposes could create a lot of jobs. Why
not develop and improve the technologies for: detecting and verifying nuclear
fuel-enrichment capabilities; monitoring transportation/smuggling of special
nuclear materials at ports and borders; and detecting/evaluating nuclear tests
conducted by other countries? There’s much work to be done improving our
capabilities in these areas which are also crucial to national security. The labs
would continue to draw big funding and provide big employment. One big dif-
fERENCE: these would be jobs people would be proud to perform.

Currently many workers at Los Alamos admit that morale is at an all-
time low after the string of safety and security scandals that have badly tar-
nished the institution’s image in the eyes of Congress and the general public.
Many bright and capable workers feel disillusioned and embarrassed about the
overwhelming agenda of nukes, nukes, nukes... an agenda more manifest
than ever as NNSA promotes Complex 2030, its hoped-for “consolidated” (yet quietly bulked-up) weapons manufacturing juggernaut.

And **while NNSA may love Complex 2030, the public does not.** DOE received more than 30,000 comments during the public comment period pursuant to the Complex 2030 hearings in late 2006. The consensus was “please don’t.”

The NonProliferation Treaty is now over 35 years old, a middle-aged baby boomer like so many of us who wrangle over policy and budget issues. But unlike the boomer generation, sure to be viewed as one of the luckiest in history, the **NPT has not been well cared for.** It’s been starved, neglected and locked in the closet like an unloved stepchild. From an international perspective, the **nearly 200 other nations** that signed this treaty along with the US see **hypocrisy, not leadership,** when we gear up to spend billions on new nuclear weapons designs and the factories where they will be produced, after spending six trillion bucks on the old stockpile which was supposed to **deter** nuclear war. **The world is watching us to see if we have any intention of living up to our binding treaty obligations.**

Entire organizations, think tanks, magazines and books are devoted to this topic. We can’t even scratch the surface here. But the idea that coherent policy initiatives aimed at **“doing the right thing” could also create economic opportunity** is one that deserves to be articulated and explored.

**Is it appropriate to discuss far-reaching national and global policies in terms of jobs, which after all are really a local concern?** Isn’t it more important to act on the big picture and “do the right thing”—especially if it’s inevitable?

Unfortunately, long-time observers of nuclear policy-making have learned that sooner or later **the jobs issue will always be on the table as a political reality.** In poor states like New Mexico, the cherished myth is that DOE butter trickles down to everyone’s tortilla. (The **truth** is that LANL money doesn’t do much for folks outside of Los Alamos County—if you find that hard to believe, check out the economic fact sheets at nukewatch.org.) Another sad tale in New Mexico is the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, steamrolled along on the basis of short-term job creation, when the real focus should have been the long-term environmental impacts of its very controversial scientific claims. So we **know** we have to talk about jobs. How about jobs that produce something better than nukes? Renewable energy and a serious approach to non-proliferation work could keep us pretty busy.

---SP
Cleaning Up the Weapons Complex

Our esteemed colleague Don Hancock from Albuquerque’s Southwest Research and Information Center gives us the big picture, and lays out urgent priorities

DOE “ACCELERATED CLEANUP”: DOESN’T MEET LEGAL AGREEMENTS, DOESN’T SAVE MONEY

The production of tens of thousands of nuclear bombs over the past 60 years has left the Department of Energy (DOE) with thousands of areas polluted with radioactive and hazardous wastes at dozens of sites nationwide. Most DOE sites are now on the Superfund list of the nation’s most contaminated areas. The contamination threatens workers, millions of people living near the sites or along major waste transportation routes, as well as some of the nation’s most important water resources, including the Columbia River, Savannah River and Snake River aquifer. Over the past decade, the DOE Environment Management (EM) program has spent about $70 billion and has declared some sites to be “closed,” though they’re still too contaminated for residential and many other uses. In its 2008 Budget Request, DOE estimates that more than $125 billion in additional funds are needed over the next several decades as the most contaminated sites remain to be cleaned up.

In the 1980s, after neighbors of DOE sites became aware of the fact (though not the extent) of environmental degradation nearby, DOE signed a slew of cleanup agreements with states and the Environmental Protection Agency. Those agreements required that the extent of contamination be determined and monitored, that cleanup plans be developed and implemented, and set milestone dates for work to be accomplished. Those legally binding agreements also allowed for fines and penalties if deadlines were not met and cleanup standards were not achieved. Many DOE contracts also have been revised. New contracts have generally required that cleanup agreement requirements be met, and provided financial incentives to contractors to exceed those requirements, at least as to meeting the milestone dates.

In recent years, DOE has been trying to “renegotiate” many of those agreements. DOE admits that the 2008 Budget Request won’t provide funding to meet all of the agreements. For example, shortfalls are substantial at Hanford, Washington, and Los Alamos, New Mexico. Hanford’s cleanup of waste from reprocessing is well behind schedule, and even though each year it receives more EM funding than any other site (about $1.8 billion is requested for FY08). It’s also the most contaminated site, one where DOE has rarely provided adequate oversight, even when citizens and state governments raise cleanup concerns.

The State of New Mexico, DOE, and LANL contractors signed a Consent Order in 2005 that set milestones for many activities, especially for investigation to
determine the extent of contamination and threats to the Rio Grande. But DOE’s budget request of $140 million for FY 2008 is about $100 million short of what is required to meet Consent Order requirements. Not meeting agreements in one year, or delaying actions necessary to meet future year requirements, can result in spreading contamination. Public and state distrust will likely grow, and additional expense will result from fines and penalties, as well as the additional cleanup that will be necessary.

“ACCELERATED CLEANUP” FAILS TO SAVE MONEY
DOE proclaimed that its 2002 “Top-to-Bottom Review” and resulting “accelerated cleanup” program with “Performance Management Plans” would reform the program. In its FY 2004 Budget Request, DOE told Congress: “EM believes it can achieve greater than $50 billion in life-cycle savings, and is committed to a stretch goal of $100 billion.” However, in the FY 2008 Budget Request, DOE has reversed that position: “EM now estimates that the life-cycle cost for the program could increase by $50 billion. Of this increase, approximately $10 billion is attributable to new scope not in EM’s previous baseline and $40 billion is associated with existing scope.” Therefore, there will be no savings in the total cleanup costs.

In addition, extensive ground water contamination at many large DOE sites has never been addressed in cleanup estimates. Why? Because there’s no current technology available to actually remove the contamination. Further, given DOE’s record, actual spending will no doubt exceed current estimates. That will certainly be true if needed cleanup is delayed now, allowing contamination to spread and requiring additional cleanup.

Moreover, the Performance Management Plans for each site are not being updated or used to hold EM accountable by Congress or the public, as they were intended. Milestones not being met at many sites, and real contamination problems are not being adequately addressed.

Rather than cleaning up more quickly, some of the most contaminated sites will have substantial delays, including the two worst sites. According to the to FY 2008 Budget Request, Hanford high-level waste cleanup is delayed seven years (from 2035 to 2042), and Savannah River Site (SRS in South Carolina) is delayed six years (from 2025 to 2031)—despite Congress acceding to DOE’s 2004 request to change the definition of high-level waste at SRS and the Idaho National Laboratory because it would speed up cleanup and save money. Thus, the reliability of cleanup dates at those and other sites is highly suspect.
"ACCELERATED CLEANUP GRAND BARGAIN" ISN'T BEING KEPT

An essential aspect of "accelerated cleanup" was that spending would be increased at some sites so that they could be cleaned up faster (many were to be done by 2006). Larger, more contaminated sites were promised that once sites were "closed," funding would be available to then accelerate cleanup at those larger sites. Overall funding would have remained stable. Rather than fulfill that promise, DOE’s EM funding decreased by about $400 million in FY 2007, would decrease by about another $400 million in FY 2008, and will continue to decline in future years, unless Congress provides the additional needed funds.

LEGACY MANAGEMENT MUST FULFILL ITS COMMITMENTS

DOE sites now being declared "closed" still have continuing requirements for funding and public participation, under the Office of Legacy Management. Adequate funding for worker pension, continued monitoring, and public information and participation at those sites will require hundreds of millions of dollars for years to come.

HOW CAN YOU CLEAN UP WHILE MAKING A BIGGER MESS?

Numerous DOE sites – Livermore (CA), Los Alamos, Nevada Test Site, Oak Ridge (TN), Pantex (TX), Sandia (NM), and SRS – where cleanup activities are in progress are currently involved in design, testing, and production of nuclear weapons. Those activities create new waste that has to be stored and disposed of, creating new contamination that adds to existing environmental problems. In addition, DOE is proposing new weapons facilities and “Complex 2030” to design and build a new generation of nuclear weapons, which will create new waste at those sites for decades – making cleanup never-ending and “pollution prevention” impossible.

The most contaminated DOE sites – Hanford, Savannah River, and Idaho National Lab – came from reprocessing spent fuel to extract plutonium and uranium for nuclear weapons. The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) would break more than 30 years of no reprocessing and would create new spent fuel storage and reprocessing facilities at DOE or non-DOE sites, with large volumes of new waste that could further pollute existing sites or contaminate new sites. Those three contaminated DOE sites are being considered for GNEP, along with three other DOE sites being cleaned up – Oak Ridge, Paducah, and Portsmouth. In addition, five non-DOE sites are being considered in Idaho, Illinois, New Mexico, and South Carolina, which would be newly contaminated if they become waste storage and reprocessing sites.

With new nuclear weapons development and GNEP, cleanup will be needed forever. New nukes are not needed. Reprocessing creates large amounts of contamination and waste, makes weapons-grade plutonium more readily available, and costs a fortune. Instead, DOE should comply with legal agreements to actually clean up sites, and not create new contamination with new nuclear weapons and reprocessing.

RECOMMENDATIONS

*Restore* funding for environmental cleanup in the 2008 budget to levels required to comply with all environmental laws and cleanup agreements.

*Require* future budget requests to include the funding levels necessary at each site to meet cleanup agreements and to fulfill Legacy Management requirements.

*Prohibit* new nuclear weapons development and reprocessing that will generate more waste and require cleanup forever. — *Don Hancock*
**Nuclear Watch of New Mexico**
551 W. Cordova Rd. #808
Santa Fe, NM 87505
505/989-7342
www.nukewatch.org

**Nuclear Watch South**
P.O. Box 8574
Atlanta, GA 31106
404/378-4263
www.nonukesyall.org

**Oak Ridge Environmental Peace Alliance**
P.O. Box 5743
Oak Ridge, TN 37831
865/483-8202
fax: 865/483-9725
www.stopthebombs

**Panhandle Area Neighbors and Landowners**
18001 El Rancho Road
Panhandle, TX 79068
806/335-1050
fax: 806/335-1050

**Peace Action Education Fund**
1100 Wayne Ave., Suite 1020
Silver Springs, MD 20910
301/565-4050
fax: 301/565-0850
www.peace-action.org

**Peace Action West**
2800 Adeline St.
Berkeley, CA 94703
510/849-2272
www.peaceactionwest.org

**Peace Farm**
188 Highway 60
Panhandle, TX 79068-9603
806/341-4801
www.peacefarm.us

**PeaceWorks Kansas City**
4509 Walnut
Kansas City, MO 64111
816/561-1181
www.peaceworkskc.org

**Physicians for Social Responsibility**
1875 Connecticut Ave
Suite 1012
Washington, DC 20009
202/667-4260
fax: 202/667-4201
www.psr.org

**Portsmouth/Piketon Residents for Environmental Safety and Security**
P.O. Box 136
Portsmouth, OH 45662
740/353-2275
fax: 740/259-3912

**Rocky Mountain Peace and Justice Center**
P.O. Box 1156
Boulder, CO 80306
303/444-6981
fax: 303/444-6523
www.rompjc.org

**Shundahai Network**
P.O. Box 1115
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
801/533-0128
fax: 801/533-0129
www.shundahai.org

**Snake River Alliance**
P.O. Box 1731
Boise, ID 83701
208/344-9161
efax: 703/997-7286
www.snakeriveralliance.org

**Southwest Research and Information Center**
P.O. Box 4524
Albuquerque, NM 87106
505/262-1862
fax: 505/262-1864
www.sric.org

**Tri-Valley CARES**
2582 Old First Street
Livermore, CA 94550
925/443-7148
fax: 925/443-0177
www.trivalleycares.org

**Women's Action for New Directions**
691 Massachusetts Ave.
Arlington, MA  02476
781/643-6740
fax: 781/643-6744
www.wand.org

---

*see the ANA website (www.ananuclear.org) for a list of our “friend” organizations*
nukewatch is privileged to exploit the considerable talents of political cartoonist Jamie Chase. His thought-provoking illustrations enliven many of our publications. We don't pay him—he does it for the glory. Thanks a million, Jamie! Check out jamiechasearts.com to see (or buy) more of his political and graphic-novel work. (You can also link to his galleries to see what he does in his day job as a nationally noted contemporary fine art painter.)

NukeWatch's own Cathie Sullivan pitched in on printing expenses. Thank you, Cathie!

This booklet was printed at Get Type in Santa Fe NM. They offer state-of-the-art digital printing and a very nice discount for non-profit groups. Thanks, guys!

nuclear watch of new mexico
505-989-7342  nukewatch.org
watchdogs
off the leash...and on the Hill !!!

Just what you’ve wished for...
a handy guide to nuclear weapons spending issues

• The FY08 budget...exposed!!!
Nuke bucks are sprinkled throughout the budget...we add it all together for you
Don’t miss the shocking conclusion!

• Non-Proliferation Work:
What those “Big Brains” at the Labs should be spending their time and our $$$ on!

• Plutonium Pits Last a While!
NNSA furiously backpedals trying to defend “Reliable Replacement Warhead”
now that we really don’t need it!

news and views, facts and figures
brought to you by
Nuclear Watch of New Mexico
nukewatch.org

in conjunction with
Alliance for Nuclear Accountability
a national coalition of grassroots groups
ananuclear.org