We had a full briefing from -----, regarding what is known about the latest LANL breach of classified documents caper.

It was a very thorough briefing and it was stated to be "OUO" (Official Use Only) meaning -----did not want us to talk about it. But here are the salient points. Please pass this info to POGO as you see fit. The briefing basically confirmed all of the info that POGO has published as being correct.

The incident started on Tuesday, 17 Oct 2006. The USB thumb drives (at least three of them) were seized first by the local LA police and later turned over to LANL and eventually the FBI. The thumb drives contained a total of 408 separate classified documents that ranged from Secret-National Security Information (pertaining to intelligence) to Secret-Restricted Data (pertaining to nuclear weapons). All of these documents originated from the classified document/classified video media vault located in the DX (now HX) Division HQ building at TA-8-21-143. In addition, in the the gal's trailer in the Royal Crest Trailer park, they also found hard copies of classified documents totalling 228 separate pages printed front and back.

The lady involved turned out to have worked in a total of three classified vaults or vault-type room (VTRs) across LANL: In Safeguards and Security Division (documents concerning the strategic nuclear material control and accountability program); in X-Division; and in Physics (P)-Division. She also had a Sigma 15 identifier to her Q-clearance, which allowed her to read documents that may have contained information about how to bypass the permissive actions links on nuclear weapons.

She was not on the periodic drug (pee) testing program, because believe it or not, one of the primary entrance criterion into the pee test program is that you work with SNM (enough Pu to make pits) on a daily basis, as do many of the workers at TA-55. However, this lady did not routinely work with or have access to weapons grade Pu, thus she was not on the Human Reliability Program (HRP).

This lady never did anything wrong; she had worked off and on at LANL since 2000 when she was in college as an undergraduate; her job as a subcontractor was terminated purely because the LANL program to archive information concerning past classifed nuclear tests/experiments ran out of money--thus, she, as a contractor, was merely "let go."

LANL/NNSA is really struggling to find a way to prevent something like this from happening again, because if the "answer" is to somehow provide additional security measures to all of LANLs vault-type classified document storage rooms, then that is "big" problem because LANL has 183 VTRs total and not enough manpower to provide any additional security measures.

Needless to say, the FBI is still trying to find out what all may have become of the over 400 classified documents that got loose outside the LANL fence. Meanwhile Linton Brooks and company are scrambling to try to come up with some sort of explanation (in preparation for the inevitable Hearings in Congress) and some sort of proposed "fix" for this latest LANL losing control of classified documents caper.

This latest information convinces me that this latest LANL boo-boo far exceeds the compromise of classified information that supposedly occurred in the Wen Ho Lee incident.

## [author unknown]